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Introduction
As the world grows more complex, the demand for peace operations will undoubtedly increase. This increase will be coupled with new challenges and complications, requiring extensive resources and expertise. A glance at the conflict-ridden environment in the Middle
East and in Africa hints of the great difficulties to come. Peace operations have placed heavy demands on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces and also on United States (US) forces but both entities have, in recent years, operated separately for peace operations. The US, a member of the UN, has chosen to contribute less in the way of personnel and more in the way of financial assistance to UN peace operations. currently and what could impede future contributions. It will be essential for the US to assist the UN in future peace operations; therefore, the GCCs must identify and navigate current obstacles before recommendations can be effectively implemented.
Obstacle #1: Defining the Operations
Defining peace operations is where the first obstacle, albeit small comparatively speaking, is found.
The 2008 UN Doctrine on Peace Operations Principles and Guidelines
includes the more traditional peacekeeping definition but also includes peacemaking, peace enforcement, conflict prevention, and peace building. According to the UN, peacekeeping is "a technique designed to preserve the peace…where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers." 2 Peacemaking includes "measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement." 3 Peace enforcement, notably the first in which military force may be used, is "the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures." 4 Conversely, the US rarely uses the term "peace operations" and, furthermore does not participate in peacekeeping operations at all but rather participates in stability operations or "various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief." 5 In the JP 3 -07, the term "peace operations" was mentioned in one paragraph, 6 in reference to the fact that peace operations are often included in major stability operations. A difference of note is that US doctrine indicates that peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations normally include predominantly combat operations, setting the stage for peace building to succeed. In addition to US hesitation regarding relinquishing control to a foreign commander, the UN membership list leaves the possibility open for the "lead" nation in a peace operation to be a non-US friendly nation or one with which the US has cautious ties. With no standing forces and difficulty "recruiting" personnel for missions, the UN cannot be sure which of its many members will take the lead on specific peace operations, leaving the possibility that peace keeping forces could be placed under any of its members. One hundred and fifteen countries contributed personnel to UN peace operations in March of 2010, with some of the largest numbers being contributed by Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Egypt, and Nigeria. 18 The logistics and politics of this issue are too large to address in the confines of this paper but it is valid to say that the US would not be amenable to placing its forces under some of the contributing nations. Although the US has tried to loosen restraints/constraints on guidelines for peace operations, it is doubtful that the bottom line will be changed in the foreseeable future, leaving the command issue a major hurdle to overcome.
Another aspect that adds to US reluctance to US contributions to UN peace operations is the persistent perception that US military forces are not trained or equipped for such operations. Earlier it was mentioned that the American people thought the US military was ill suited for peace operation missions. The US military was not and is not ill suited rather, it was ill prepared. 19 In the last decade, world events have been a catalyst for change within the US military. There has been a shift in doctrine and a general military acknowledgement that "future operations will regularly include missions to stabilize areas during transitions from war to peace and to assist with reconstruction during these 
Increased Contributions Imperative
While the counterarguments present perhaps compelling points on whether the US should be asked to commit more resources to UN peace operations when there is so much unsettled within the US itself, the fact remains that "United Nations peacekeeping is at a Although the problems the US has internally appear to eclipse the demands of the future UN peace operations, it is impossible to keep the rest of the global environment from affecting the US. The US borders remain porous and isolation is impossible and impractical.
The US military is, indeed, stretched thin but has proven itself more than capable of taking on the tasks presented. The US Combatant Commands are finding ways to work smarter, incorporate more civilians and contractors when possible, and make the best possible use of their resources. As for the argument that the military cannot "defend the homeland" if it is taxed more, the military has spent the last decade engaged in conflicts and heavily so but has still managed to come to the assistance of the homeland when necessary. The report does go on to say that there are many lessons to be learned from the massive military response to Hurricane Katrina; however, the lessons learned focus primarily on the lack of military is adept at using the resources at its disposal to the best of its ability and has learned extensively from past mistakes. It is impossible to guarantee the US military will not have to extend itself and stretch further if increasing contributions to UN peace operations, but the US should remain confident that the best interests of the US will stay first priority. As the world grows smaller and becomes more globalized, it would be narrow-minded to suggest the US military would be able to ignore the plea of the UN and the global society.
Obstacles Not Insurmountable: Recommendations to Consider
The aforementioned obstacles to increased US contributions to UN peace operations will not entirely disappear in the near future; however, with the current global environment there is not time to wait until they do. This is a pivotal point for the US and its commitment or lack of commitment to peace operations, specifically to UN peace operations. Will the US continue its "basic" support or will it become a more vigorous leader?
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The previous failures and successes during peace operations have given the US and the UN much to learn from. The fact that both entities have revamped doctrine (or established doctrine) indicates the level of importance placed on future peace operations (and stability operations). There has been an increase of efforts within the US to coordinate USG entities for improved peace/stability operations; however, it is important that the US coordinate overseas as well. The obstacles hindering increased US involvement in UN peace operations individually may seem insurmountable -and present viable issues associated with any future peace operation contributions. Now that these obstacles have been more or less thoroughly discussed, it is possible to begin exploring ways that the US can increase contributions, while navigating through the maze of obstacles. The following are some examples that the US and adequate detail in response planning and do not mention a lack of personnel (in fact, there was a glut of personnel but the plans failed to adequately and affectively use the number of personnel provided). 35 Holt. in the current global environment, it is difficult to ascertain whether these peacekeepers are going to be the most effective personnel for future operations. A recommendation to explore relating to this is for the US DOD to assist in the training of the US DOS peacekeeping force.
The training would not be intended to make the peacekeepers military per se but to arm them with the tools and skills needed to face the type of operations they will be attempting.
Provide Shared Doctrine. Although the UN has participated in peace operations since 1948, the December 2008 UN peace operations doctrine was the first of its type published. The US military has included peace operations and stability operations in many more joint publications and, based on its after-action protocols, has most likely developed many more lessons learned. The US could share its doctrine with the UN and provide details about specific lessons learned so the UN would not have to make similar mistakes.
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Training of UN Peacekeepers/Member Nations. If the US is not able to provide personnel to UN peace operations, it could augment UN peace operations by offering to train UN forces before they are sent on a mission. This offer would be dependent on which nations are participating in the mission, but the US military undeniably grows skills that will be imperative for successful future operations including arms training, military police training, and general operational training that help instill situational awareness and operational security understanding. The US could send military contingents overseas to train forces in 44 GPOI.1 45 GPOI.1 46 The classification issue may come into play with this recommendation; sharing doctrine may have to occur on a case-by-case basis depending on which country is the lead country for the particular peace operation.
host countries, with an abridged one or two-week crash course in skills specific to the type of mission at hand. A more realistic, but potentially more challenging security-wise, option would be for the US military to welcome foreign representatives to participate in sections of US military training (specific to stability operations). These representatives could then go and educate the rest of the force before the mission. This would obviously present a host of issues including schedule de-confliction, financial allowances, security issues, and ROE differences but could be considered over the alternatives and despite the obstacles.
Establish a committee or working group. In order to more thoroughly explore the full range of options available to the US and the US Combatant Commanders for augmenting future UN peace operations, the establishment of a working group or a committee is recommended.
While this is a broad overview of the potential impediments to successful coordination and US augmentation of UN peace operations, it is by no means an all-inclusive paper, and there certainly exist many more nuances to consider when undertaking such operations. Such a committee or working group will be able to evaluate and analyze all lawful options and ensure the US is prepared to the utmost when it is asked to assist.
Concluding Remarks
The future of UN peace operations is unknown, but it is certain that, in order to establish "a better state of peace," 47 it will be necessary for the US to increase its contributions to such operations. Based on the changing global environment and the fact that "peace keepers" are now being asked to operate in areas where there is hostile unrest, traditional peacekeeping forces and training may not be sufficient to achieve mission success.
It is in this case where the UN and the US have the chance to synergize, with the value of the performance of the two together being greater than the sum of the individual parts. Even if 47 Liddel Hart
